




The election of the New Zealand Labour-led coalition government in 2017 
has	contributed	to	a	number	of	developments	in	the	area	of	employment	law.	
This	is	reflected	in	this	employment	law	review,	which	contains	a	summary	
of the legislative changes and a review of the main case law over the past 
two	years.
The review considers the 2018 amendments to the Employment Relations 
Act	2000	(ER	Act),	which	has	updated	a	range	of	rules	related	to	collective	
bargaining,	trial	periods,	rest	and	meal	breaks	and	reinstatement.	The	review	
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II Legislative Changes — Employment Relations Amendment 
Act 2018
The Employment Relations Amendment Act 2018 came into force on 
12	December	2018	and	makes	amendments	to	the	ER	Act.	These	amendments	
are designed to restore and improve the minimum standards and protections 
for employees, strengthen collective bargaining in the workforce and enhance 
union	rights.1 Most changes to the ER Act came into force on Monday 6 May 
2019.
Over the years and up to 2015, various amendments were made to the ER 
Act with the result that the rights of trade unions and collective bargaining 
had	been	seriously	eroded.	The	2018	amendments	 intend	to	restore	 the	
original provisions of the ER Act with a view to strengthen the position of 




pay rate for time spent undertaking union activities during their normal hours 
of	work.	The	entitlement	applies	where:	the	employee	has	been	appointed	
or	elected	as	a	union	delegate;	 the	activities	 relate	 to	 representation	of	
employees	of	 the	employer;	and	 the	activities	would	not	unreasonably	
disrupt	the	employer’s	business.4
Since 2011, trade union access to the workplace had been subjected to 
the	prior	consent	of	the	employer.	Amended	s	20	of	the	ER	Act	now	allows	
union representatives to enter the workplace without the prior consent of the 
employer for purposes related to the union’s members, the union’s business 
or	health	and	safety	issues.	In	other	cases	representatives	of	the	union	must	
request and obtain the employer’s consent before entering the workplace 
unless there is a collective agreement in force between the employer and the 
union	or	bargaining	has	been	initiated.5
The second main series of changes to the ER Act concerns employers’ 
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employees covered by awards during the period between 1936 and 1991,6 
but this was radically changed by the adoption of the Employment Contracts 
Act 1991, which introduced a strict regime of freedom of association and 
union	membership.	The	ER	Act	remained	generally	neutral	on	this	issue	but	
in an effort to enforce the freedom of association, employers were under 
no obligation to inform employees about the unions operating within the 
undertaking.	New	s	30A	of	the	ER	Act	changes	this	by	providing	that	a	






In addition, the new s 62A of the ER Act requires the employer to 
share with the union the information about any new employee, unless the 
employee	objects.	Within	the	first	10	days	of	a	new	employee’s	employment,	
the employer must provide a form to assess whether an employee intends to 
join	a	union	or	objects	to	the	employer	providing	information	to	the	union.8 
New employees are therefore provided with an active choice as to whether 
they	would	like	to	be	involved	within	unions	or	not.
The restoration of the 30-day rule for new employees represents another 
major	change	to	the	ER	Act.	Whether	they	are	or	are	not	a	union	member,	
the terms of employment of all new employees must be consistent with the 
applicable collective agreement,9 unless there are more favourable terms 
agreed	between	the	employer	and	the	employee.10 After the 30-day period 
has expired, the employer and the employee may vary the terms in an 
individual	agreement	as	both	parties	see	fit.11
A third key series of changes to the ER Act concerns the rules around 
collective	bargaining.	The	objective	of	the	ER	Act	is	to	build	productive	
employment relationships through the promotion of good faith by, in 
particular,	promoting	collective	bargaining.12 The duty of good faith “to 
conclude a collective agreement unless there is a genuine reason, based on 
reasonable grounds, not to”, removed from the ER Act under the National-
led	government,	has	been	now	restored	in	s	33(1).
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The content of a collective agreement is also updated and must now 




last resort, they represent legitimate actions and a fundamental right used 
by	unions	to	advance	their	bargaining	aims.14	Section	82A(2)(a)	recognises	
that strikes are a lawful action if preceded by a secret ballot of the union’s 
members	 employed	by	 the	employers.	No	ballot	 is	 required	where	 the	
proposed strike relates to a lawful strike on the grounds of health or safety 
under	s	84.
New	Zealand	saw	a	significant	uptake	in	strike	activities	over	the	2018–19	
period, which is likely to have resulted from a build-up of issues including 
underfunding,	wage	suppression	and	under-investment.15 Among the strikers 




highlighted that as unions have become more feminised and mature, the 
union	movement	has	shifted	accordingly.16 The form of strikes has also 
evolved.	Complete	“walk	off	the	job”	strikes	are	often	replaced	with	partial	






Finally, a series of amendments is concerned with employment right 
protection.	Following	these	amendments,	the	90-day	trial	period	is	restricted	
under s 67A of the ER Act to small-to-medium-sized businesses that 
employ	fewer	than	20	employees.	This	 limitation	provides	flexibility	to	
small employers who are presumed to only have access to limited human 
resource	services.	As	a	result,	it	is	assumed	that	recruitment	processes	and	
staff management is of a lower standard in such small-to-medium-sized 
 13	 Section	54(4)(b).
 14 Avalon Kent “Did the sky fall? The 2018 New Zealand strike ‘wave’” [2018] ELB 2 
at	2.
 15	 At	2.
 16 Clare de Lore “Striking out in a new direction” New Zealand Listener (New Zealand, 
3	February	2018)	at	34.
 17 Aimee Shaw “H&M workers take partial-strike action” The New Zealand Herald (online 
ed,	Auckland,	6	July	2019)..
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businesses	than	larger	ones.18 Large businesses of more than 20 employees 








require breaks to default to the middle of the work period if it is reasonable 
and	practicable	to	do	so.	Exceptions	are	available	in	some	circumstances	
such as employees engaged in New Zealand’s national security or where 
breaks	are	provided	for	in	other	legislation.20
Finally, the amended s 125 of the ER Act restores reinstatement as the 
primary remedy where it is determined that the employee has a personal 
grievance.21 Amendments brought to the Act in 2010 had only made 
reinstatement	an	option	if	it	was	practicable	and	reasonable	to	do	so.22 Now, 
unless it is impracticable, an order of reinstatement must be made to the 
employee’s	original	position.	One	commentator	has	predicted	that	restoring	
reinstatement as the primary remedy will have little impact upon personal 
grievances.23 However, as was stated in Ashton v Shoreline Hotel,24 to 
primarily award compensation for job loss, instead of reinstatement, creates 
a	system	for	licensing	unjustified	dismissals.
III Domestic Violence
The Domestic Violence—Victims’ Protection Act 2018, which came into 
effect	on	1	April	2019,	inserts	a	new	pt	6AB	into	the	ER	Act.	The	2018	
Act	also	amends	the	Holidays	Act	2003	and	the	Human	Rights	Act	1993.	









 24 Ashton v Shoreline Hotel [1994]	1	ERNZ	421	(EmpC)	at	436.
 25 In accordance with s 69ABA of the Domestic Violence—Victims’ Protection Act 2018, 
a person has been affected by domestic violence if they are a person against whom any 
other	person	inflicts,	or	has	inflicted,	domestic	violence	or	a	person	with	whom	there	
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recognises the gravity of harm caused by domestic violence by establishing 
supportive workplaces in order to help victims remain in employment and 
find	a	way	out	of	violence.26 New Zealand is the second country in the world, 
after the Philippines, to offer this type of protection to employees who are 




violence have the right to make a request, or have a request made on their 
behalf,	 for	a	short-term	(two-months	or	 less)	variation	of	 their	working	
arrangements.	Employers	must	ensure	that	any	of	their	employees	affected	
by domestic violence have their requests considered appropriately and 
responsibly.	Under	 s	 69ABF(2),	 an	 employer	must	 respond	within	 10	
working days of receiving the request and may only refuse to grant the 
request if proof of domestic violence is required but not produced, or if 
the	request	cannot	be	reasonably	accommodated	for	business	reasons.	The	
employer’s failure to address a request can be referred to a Labour Inspector, 
mediation	or	the	Employment	Authority.
An employee affected by domestic violence may make a request at any 
time, regardless of when the violence occurred, even if it occurred before 
employment	started.27 The request must be made in writing, stating the 
employee’s name, date of the request and that the request is made under 
s	69ABC	of	the	ER	Act.	The	request	must	further	include	the	required	new	
working	arrangements	as	well	as	explain	how	the	flexible	employment	will	
assist	the	employee	with	regard	to	their	situation.28 Such requirements, in 
particular the requirement to provide proof of domestic violence, might act 
as	deterrents	to	employees	who	will	find	domestic	violence	a	painful	and	
sensitive	subject	to	raise.	It	is	unlikely	that	employees	will	be	able	to	access	
these rights unless employers are proactive in minimising such deterrents by, 
for instance, providing template forms, or appointing staff to assist employees 
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The Domestic Violence—Victims’ Protection Act 2018 creates a new 
category of leave under the Holidays Act 2003, which is distinct from 
annual,	sick	and	bereavement	leave	entitlements.	The	law	requires	employers	
to provide up to 10 days’ paid leave from work for victims of domestic 
violence,	separate	from	annual	leave	and	sick	leave	entitlements.	Employees	
are entitled to the leave on the condition that they have completed six months 
of	current	continuous	employment	with	the	employer.29 Entitlement to such 
leave also arises if the employee has worked for the employer over a period 
of six months for an average of at least 10 hours per week30 and for no less 
than one hour in every week during those six months or no less than 40 hours 
in	every	month	during	that	period.31 Despite this being a new type of leave 
for New Zealand law, it must be treated similarly to sick or bereavement 
leave.	Therefore,	employers	must	be	flexible	and	aware	that	they	may	be	
without	staff	members	for	up	to	10	days	at	a	time.32
In addition, discriminating against employees affected by domestic 
violence	is	prohibited	under	the	new	s	62A	of	the	Human	Rights	Act	1993.	
This provision applies during recruitment processes as well as within the 
period	of	employment.	An	employee	has	grounds	for	a	personal	grievance	
under the ER Act, or a claim under the Human Rights Act, if they are treated 
adversely in their employment on the grounds that the employee is, or is 
suspected or assumed or believed to be, a person affected by domestic 
violence.
The new law is relatively complex and highly prescriptive but these 
new	 requirements	 should	be	understood	as	 a	minimum	 for	 employers.	
It is expected that employers who care about employees’ wellbeing and 
morale, gender diversity and inclusion, improving staff retention, enhancing 
productivity, and being seen as socially responsible must do more than meet 
these	minimum	legal	requirements.	The	very	personal	nature	of	domestic	









 32 Hamish Kynaston and others “Legislative changes coming to a workplace near you” 
(16	April	2019)	Buddle	Findlay	<buddlefindlay.com>.






triangular employment relationships and represents a response to concerns 
regarding	the	exploitation	of	temporary	workers.33	It	reflects	New	Zealand’s	
evolving workplace structure, which shows a steady increase in employees 
entering into triangular arrangements as well as other forms of precarious 
employment.	Triangular	employment	arrangements	arise	where	an	employee	
is employed by one company or organisation, such as a temp agency, but 
works	under	the	control	or	direction	of	a	controlling	third	party.	Triangular	
employment arrangements are known to increase the risk of non-compliance 
with employment law because of their complexity and the temporary nature 
of	the	work.34 The general absence of legislation in this area contributes to 
the	exploitation	of	workers	and	risks	increasing	their	precariousness.	The	
amendments to the ER Act aim to “ensure that employees employed by one 




a contract or other arrangement with an employer where one of its employees 
performs	work	for	the	benefit	of	that	person;	and	the	third	party	exercises,	
or is entitled to exercise, control over the employee in a way that resembles 
the	control	 that	 the	employer	has	over	 the	employee.	Thus,	controlling	
third parties will no longer be able to avoid liability by hiding behind the 
employee’s	primary	employer.
As the law currently stands, triangular employees cannot easily claim 
a personal grievance against the controlling third party as the employee 
must	first	prove	that	the	third	party	was	in	fact	their	 true	employer.	This	
often leads to unfair employment practices and a deprivation of employment 
rights.	The	key	changes	brought	by	the	Act	provide	a	simplification	of	the	
personal grievance process and an increased access to justice for triangular 
employees.	The	new	s	103B	of	the	ER	Act	provides	that	an	employee	can	
apply to join a controlling third party to an existing personal grievance 
claim	against	their	employer.	Before	this	can	happen,	an	employee	must	
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raise a personal grievance with their employer regarding an alleged action 
which	occurred	while	working	for	the	controlling	third	party.36 Furthermore, 
pursuant to the new s 115A, within 90 days of the personal grievance being 
raised, either the employee or employer must notify the controlling third 
party that they consider their actions to have caused or contributed to the 
personal	grievance.37 Pursuant to the new s 123A, in making a decision 
with regard to remedies, the Employment Authority or court must consider 
the extent of the actions caused or contributed to by the controlling third 
party	which	gave	rise	to	the	personal	grievance.38 Any remedies awarded 
must	reflect	the	extent	of	the	parties’	contribution.	An	employee	may	be	
reimbursed for any lost wages or salary, or may receive compensation for 
any	humiliation,	loss	of	dignity	and	injury	to	feelings	suffered.39
Industries involved in labour hire arrangements, those in sectors affected 
by	seasonal	fluctuations,	and	those	who	hire	a	 temporary	workforce	are	
clearly	 impacted	by	this	new	law.	However,	 it	 is	 important	 to	note	 that	
triangular employment relationships are also likely to apply to employees 
on	secondment	from	their	employer	to	another	business	or	organisation.
V Privacy Bill 2018
The Privacy Bill 2018 was introduced to Parliament by Hon Andrew Little 
on	the	20	March	2018.	The	Bill,	which	is	expected	to	be	adopted	during	the	
course of 2020, will update and modernise the 25-year-old Privacy Act 1993 
and	bring	New	Zealand’s	privacy	law	up	to	date	with	the	digital	society.	
The reform will also bring New Zealand into line with international laws, 
in	particular	with	the	European	General	Data	Protection	Regulation.40 One 
of the key purposes of the Privacy Bill is to assure individuals that their 
personal information is secure and treated properly by strengthening the 
compliance	aspects	of	the	regime.41
A key change introduced in the Bill is the mandatory reporting of privacy 
breaches.	Clause	118	of	the	Bill	provides	that	an	agency	must	notify	the	






2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data 
Protection	Regulation)	[2016]	OJ	L/119. 
 41	 New	Zealand	Parliament	“Privacy	Bill”	<parliament.nz>.
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a	privacy	breach	has	occurred.	Any	affected	individuals	must	be	notified	
of the breach or a public notice must be raised where a privacy breach is 
at	risk	of	causing	harm.42 What amounts to a privacy breach is set at a low 
level and includes any unauthorised or accidental access to, or disclosure, 
alteration,	 loss	or	destruction	of	personal	 information.43 Alternatively, a 
“privacy breach” means an action that prevents the agency from accessing 
the	information	on	a	temporary	or	permanent	basis.44
Agencies which fail to report a breach to the Privacy Commissioner are 
liable	to	fines	of	up	to	$10,000,45 which represents a relatively moderate 
remedy	 in	comparison	 to	other	countries.	 If	 the	Privacy	Commissioner	
considers there to be a breach of privacy law or there has been a breach of 
an	IPP	(information	privacy	principle)	or	interference	with	an	individual’s	
privacy under another Act, they may issue a compliance notice to an 
agency	to	enable	them	to	comply	with	the	law.46 The Bill also makes it a 




Bill empowers the Commissioner to prohibit the disclosure of information 
overseas without consent, unless the overseas person is in a country with 
comparable privacy laws, or the agency believes the person will protect the 
information	in	a	comparable	manner	and	there	is	a	permitted	exception.47
Furthermore, the Privacy Commissioner’s powers are strengthened 
through the new Bill as they will be able to make decisions on complaints 
relating	to	access	 to	 information.48 This is compared to decisions being 
placed	in	the	hands	of	the	Human	Rights	Tribunal.	The	Commissioner’s	
decisions	will	be	able	to	be	appealed	to	the	Tribunal.	The	Commissioner	is	
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VI Personal Grievances
A Payment in lieu as opposed to working out notice period
In Ioan v Scott Technology NZ Ltd,49 it was claimed that proper written 




Mr Ioan appealed on a question of law on the basis of the letter provided 
by	Scott	stating:50
Your notice period, as outlined in your employment period, is four weeks 
however we have decided you will be paid in lieu of working out your 
notice	period.	Therefore,	your	effective	last	day	of	work	is	today.
In agreement with Judge Holden in the Employment Court, the Court of 
Appeal held that notice of termination in accordance with s 67B of the ER 
Act includes a situation where an employer gives the requisite notice period 
but does not require the employee to work it and instead pays for that period 
of	notice.51 Therefore, the employee was prevented from raising a personal 
grievance	as	the	requisite	notice	had	been	given.	The	Supreme	Court	has	
subsequently	accepted	and	agreed	with	this	interpretation.52
B 90-day trial period
Roach v Nazareth Care Charitable Trust53 highlights the importance of 
complying	with	notice	provisions	when	relying	on	the	90-day	trial	period.	
Roach was dismissed from his role at Nazareth Care which was subject 
to	a	90-day	trial	period.	However,	Roach	had	previously	been	offered	and	
accepted a Business Manager’s position at Nazareth, which was also subject 
to	a	90-day	trial.	He	never	started	work	in	this	position	or	performed	any	
of the duties before he took on the current role, which he was dismissed 
from.	Roach	therefore	argued	that	Nazareth	could	not	rely	on	the	90-day	
trial period as he was a previous employee and that Nazareth failed to give 
him	the	requisite	notice.




 53 Roach v Nazareth Care Charitable Trust [2018]	NZEmpC	123.
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Roach argued that for the purposes of s 5 of the ER Act, he was a person 
intending	to	work,	thus	the	90-day	trial	period	was	not	valid.	The	Court,	
however, agreed with Nazareth that the purpose of s 67A of the ER Act is 
to enable an employer to assess an employee’s suitability for the position 
without	opening	itself	up	to	a	personal	grievance	action.	The	Court	also	
emphasised that actual performance of the tasks is needed, not just mere 
agreement	to	conduct	work.	On	the	basis	of	this	reasoning,	the	90-day	trial	
period	was	held	to	be	valid	under	s	67A.
When Roach was dismissed, instead of working his notice period, he 
received	payment	in	lieu.	He	argued	that	Nazareth	could	not	rely	on	the	
trial period due to inadequate notice, as there was no mention of a payment 
in	lieu	notice	in	his	employment	agreement.	The	Court	agreed	with	Roach	









This case demonstrates that it is critical for an employer to include and 
follow the trial period provisions contained in the respective employment 
agreement	before	termination.	Furthermore,	this	case	confirms	that	a	trial	
period commences only when that employee actually performs and carries 
out	work.
C Managing illness and mental health issues










 57 FGH v RST [2018]	NZEmpC	60,	(2018)	15	NZELR	944.	
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(ADD),	which	consequently	affected	her	work	performance.	As	a	result,	
H	fell	 ill	and	was	forced	to	leave	work	for	a	few	weeks.	Before	leaving,	
she asserted that she had been bullied and that the workplace had various 
health	and	safety	issues.58 After returning to work, there were a number of 
disputes	and	disagreements	between	H	and	her	employer.	H	then	raised	
a disadvantage grievance stating that RST failed to provide a safe work 
environment when dealing with her performance issues, claiming this caused 
unwarranted	stress.59
The Employment Court held that RST’s actions were not what a fair and 
reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances60 and that RST 
failed to provide H with a safe and healthy work environment, in breach of 
statutory	and	contractual	obligations.	In	saying	this,	the	Court	accepted	that	
H’s	unjustified	disadvantage	grievance	was	established.61
This	 case	 provides	 insight	 on	 two	 important	matters.	 First,	where	
employees are acting inappropriately and disciplinary matters commence, 
an employer must be aware of any underlying medical conditions which 
could	be	linked	to	the	employee’s	work	performance.62 Second, when an 
employer is aware that an employee has a medical condition, steps must be 
taken to manage the employee and employers must be prepared to seek a 
medical	assessment.63
VII Workplace Bullying and Harassment
Bullying	and	harassment	within	 the	workplace	can	create	a	 significant	
risk	to	an	individual’s	health	and	safety.	Consequently,	an	employer	has	a	
legal obligation under the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 to manage 
risks arising from the conduct of their business, which includes protecting 
employees	 from	harmful	behaviour	 such	as	bullying.64 WorkSafe New 
Zealand, acknowledging that bullying in the workplace has destructive 
effects on employees, published guidelines to provide employers, employees 
and the courts with direction on potential issues of bullying within the 
workplace.	The	guidelines	defines	workplace	bullying	as	“repeated	and	





 62 Cassandra Kenworthy “FGH v RST ”	[2018]	ELB	103	at	104.
 63	 At	104.
 64	 David	Beck	“Resolving	Workplace	‘Bullying’”	(2018)	43(3)	NZJER	33.
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can lead to a problematic understanding of the term as seen in Emmerson 
v Northland District Health Board.66 Here, Dr Emmerson alleged that she 
was	subject	to	continuous	bullying	and	intimidation	from	another	doctor.67 
Furthermore, she stated that NDHB were aware or should have been aware 
of the bullying and that they permitted it to occur, thus failing to provide 
her	with	a	safe	working	environment.68 It was acknowledged that NDHB 
had	their	own	definition,	different	from	WorkSafe’s,	as	to	what	constituted	
bullying,	which	was	defined	as:69
Bullying in the workplace is repeated, unwanted, unwarranted behaviour 
that	a	person	finds	offensive,	 intimidating	and/or	humiliating	so	as	 to	
have a detrimental effect upon a person’s dignity, safety, wellbeing and 
functionality.
The Court assessed the alleged bullying in accordance with the NDHB 
definition.70 In turn, it was established that Dr Emmerson’s new role in the 
organisation	subjected	her	to	greater	scrutiny.71 This, as well as other factors, 
affected	her	health	and	performance	as	a	doctor.	The	Court	held	that	although	
many	situations	were	difficult	for	Dr	Emmerson,	 they	did	not	constitute	
bullying.72 Therefore, although behaviour may have been unwanted, it was 
not seen as unwarranted by the Court and so the claim of workplace bullying 
was	dismissed.













 73 Geoff Davenport “Workplace bullying — the challenges of seeking redress” [2019] ELB 
58	at	59.
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Emmerson v Northland District Health Board also highlights the issue 
of	perceptions	regarding	bullying.	Dr	Emmerson	claimed	that	she	was	often	
“ripped	 into”,	blamed,	 threatened	and	given	 inconsistent	 instructions.74 
The Court acknowledged that in such a scenario it is important to consider 
the	perception	of	 the	opposing	party.	Considering	both	sides,	 the	Court	
established that Emmerson had exaggerated the alleged events and that 
although	many	situations	were	challenging,	they	were	not	bullying.75 Such 
an approach emphasises the need to consider different perceptions of the 
alleged	workplace	bullying.
In Marx v Southern Cross Campus,76 the Employment Court distinguished 
bullying	from	discussion	in	performance	meetings.	Although	conversations	
may	be	difficult	and	challenging,	 it	does	not	necessarily	mean	 that	 the	
circumstances	amount	to	bullying.77 In such situations the court will assess 
the background of events to determine whether conduct amounts to bullying 
or	simply	represents	a	criticism	with	regard	to	performance.
Relatedly,	allegations	of	sexual	harassment	must	be	taken	seriously.	
Section 37 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 provides that a 
person	conducting	a	business	or	undertaking	(PCBU)	must	ensure	that	the	
workplace is without risks to the mental and physical health and safety of a 
person.	Sexual	harassment	can	cause	both	mental	and	physical	harm,	thus,	
employers	must	be	proactive	about	preventing	this	harm	from	occurring.78 
Employees are protected from sexual and racial harassment in the workplace 
under	the	ER	Act	as	well	as	under	the	Human	Rights	Act	1993.	Section	117	




the employer or their representative must take whatever steps practicable to 
prevent	the	behaviour	occurring	again.79 An employee may take a personal 
grievance against an employer who fails in its duty to take practicable steps 
under	s	118.	The	Human	Rights	Act	1993	sets	out	similar	obligations	for	
employers to investigate allegations of sexual harassment and provides that 
failure	to	do	so	may	give	rise	to	an	action	under	that	Act.80 Furthermore, under 
s 68 of the Human Rights Act 1993, vicarious liability can be established if 
 74 Emmerson, above n 66, at	[162].
 75	 At	[172]–[173].
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it can be proved that the employer did not take reasonably practicable steps 
to	prevent	the	sexual	harassment	from	occurring.
The extent of the employer’s duty to take practicable steps has been 
discussed in A Ltd v H.81 In it, the Court of Appeal held that employers’ 
decisions should not be subjected to pedantic scrutiny, instead the proper 
approach is to overall assess whether the decision was fair and reasonable 
in	all	of	the	circumstances.	In	this	case,	H	was	dismissed	after	it	was	found	
that he had breached A Ltd’s sexual harassment policy, leading to serious 
misconduct.	The	respective	misconduct	 involved	H,	a	51-year-old	pilot,	
making inappropriate comments, advances and physical touches towards a 
19-year-old	flight	attendant.
Judge Corkill in the Employment Court held that H had been treated 
unfairly	in	the	investigation	process.	He	stated	that	all	evidence	was	not	
considered	in	an	even-handed	manner.82 Further, it was said that there was 
disparity between the way H was treated compared to how A Ltd treated 
another	employee	in	similar	circumstances	years	earlier.	Accordingly,	Judge	
Corkill determined that H’s dismissal was not a decision which a fair and 
reasonable	employer	could	make.83
On appeal, the Court of Appeal disagreed and while it was accepted 
that a balanced approach is appropriate, it said that the Employment Court 
did not allow for a range of potential responses or actions that may be open 
to	a	fair	and	reasonable	employer.	Based	on	the	approach	taken	in	Angus v 
Ports of Auckland Ltd,84 the Court of Appeal emphasised that under s 103A 
of the ER Act, a case-by-case assessment of what the employer did and how 
a fair and reasonable employer in the circumstances could have acted is 
necessary.85 The Court decided to set aside the Employment Court’s orders, 
granting H reinstatement, payment of wages and compensation as well as 
referring	the	matter	back	to	the	Employment	Court	for	remedies.	Thus,	this	
case	provides	clarity	on	the	overall	standard	of	justification	for	dismissal,	
which is reasonableness and fairness as opposed to exactness and a judicial-
like	process.86
 81 A Ltd v H [2016]	NZCA	419,	[2017]	2	NZLR	295.
 82 H v A Ltd [2014]	NZEmpC	189	at	[79].
 83	 At	[80].
 84 Angus v Ports of Auckland Ltd (No 2) [2011]	NZEmpC	160,	[2011]	ERNZ	466.
 85 A Ltd v H,	above	n	81,	at	[46].
 86 Johanna Drayton and Alistair Clarke “A Ltd v H [2016] NZCA 419” [2018] ELB 56 
at	59.
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VIII What Constitutes Work?





The discussion began in South Canterbury District Health Board,87 where 
the issue was whether staying overnight at accommodation provided by the 
employer could be considered work for the purposes of s 6 of the Minimum 
Wage	Act.	The	nature	of	the	employment	required	anaesthetic	technicians	
to be placed on a call-back roster as surgery services were offered 24 hours 
each	day.	It	was	expected	that	employees	should	be	at	the	hospital	within	10	
minutes	of	being	called	back.	Employees	who	lived	more	than	10	minutes	
away were provided free accommodation adjacent to the hospital when on 
call.	The	issue	was	to	determine	whether	this	could	be	considered	work.
In reaching a conclusion, the “sleep-over principles” developed in Idea 
Services Ltd v Dickson 88	were	applied:89






work	for	the	purposes	of	s	6	of	the	Minimum	Wage	Act.90 This was furthermore 
accepted	by	the	Court	of	Appeal	and	leave	to	appeal	was	therefore	declined.91
On a similar issue, Labour Inspector of the Ministry of Business, 
Innovation and Employment v Smiths City Group Ltd 92 considered whether 
a 15-minute staff meetings held every morning, before store opening, at 
Smith City Group Ltd constituted work as per s 6 of the Minimum Wage 
Act.	Sales	staff,	who	were	expected	to	attend	the	8.45	am–9.00	am	weekday	
meetings	and	9.45	am–10.00	am	weekend	meetings,93 were not paid for 
 87 South Canterbury District Health Board v Sanderson [2018]	NZCA	82.
 88 Idea Services Ltd v Dickson [2011]	NZCA	14,	[2011]	2	NZLR	522	at	[7]	and	[10].
 89 South Canterbury District Health Board,	above	n	87,	at	[5].
 90	 At	[6].	
 91	 At	[15].
 92 Labour Inspector of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment v Smiths City 
Group Ltd [2018]	NZEmpC	43.
 93	 At	[5].
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these	meetings	and	were	instead	paid	from	when	the	stores	opened.	Smiths	
City considered these meetings as an “integral part of a store manager’s 
job” and it even went as far as having a regional manager undertaking 
regular	checks	that	each	store	was	in	fact	holding	the	meetings.94 Smiths 
City explained that in compensation employees were able to take longer 
breaks	or	even	finish	early	when	stores	were	quiet.95
In determining whether employees are to be paid for the meetings, 
the Employment Court also turned to the three factors established in Idea 
Services Ltd v Dickson.96	With	regard	to	the	first	factor,	Smiths	City	argued	in	
contrast to the employees in Idea Services, Smiths City employees were not 
constrained	or	compelled	to	attend	the	meeting.	In	Idea Services employees 




distinct in the nature of the work required from employees, the Employment 
Court concluded nevertheless that employees were constrained because 
in practical reality sales staff had to attend the meeting so as not to be 
seen	as	a	poor	performer.97 Employees making a presentation were also 
constrained,	as	they	had	to	attend	and	discuss	the	promotion	of	products.98 
With regard to the responsibility factor, the Court considered that while there 
were no “active” responsibilities as such, the employees were still obligated 
to sit, listen and absorb the work-related information being presented to 
them.	Employees	presenting,	however,	had	work-related	responsibilities	




The meetings were therefore found to be “work” as per s 6 of the Minimum 
Wage	Act.
Finally,	the	question	as	to	whether	donning	and	doffing	could	be	defined	
as “work” under s 6 of the Minimum Wage Act 1983 arose in Ovation New 
Zealand Ltd.101 Here, it was said that work was expected to be performed 
 94	 At	[10].
 95	 At	[12].
 96 Idea Services Ltd,	above	n	88.




 101 Ovation New Zealand Ltd v The New Zealand Meat Workers and Related Trades Union 
Inc [2018] NZEmpC 151 [Ovation (EC)].
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during	employees’	breaks	in	the	form	of	“doffing	and	stowing	and	sterilising	
equipment	 and	gear	 and	donning	 such	equipment	 and	gear	 for	use”.102 
Based on the three factors from Idea Solutions, the Court concluded that 
the	constraints	placed	on	the	employees	were	significant.103 Furthermore, the 
responsibilities placed on employees when entering and leaving processing 
areas were enough to satisfy the second Idea Solutions factor.	 Lastly,	
donning	and	doffing	was	considered	to	be	an	essential	part	of	the	business:	




IX Interpretation of a Collective Agreement and the Estoppel 
Defence
The case of AsureQuality Ltd106 demonstrates the importance of keeping 
accurate records and provides a good example of the application of the 
estoppel	doctrine.	This	case	concerned	a	debate	over	 the	 interpretation	
of	a	clause	in	the	employees’	collective	agreement.	The	particular	clause	
10.4(b)	stated	that	“[a]ll work by an employee on Saturdays and Sundays 
at Monday to Friday plants will be paid at T1.5”.107 Controversy arose over 
whether employees in Monday to Friday plants whose shifts carry over from 
Friday	night	to	Saturday	morning	were	entitled	to	T1.5,	which	the	Court	
described	as	“the	‘hang-over’	period”.108 Another issue arose in this case as 
to whether the Public Service Association was estopped from relying on its 
interpretation	in	the	particular	circumstances.
In	relation	to	the	interpretation	issue,	the	Court	considered	clause	10.4	
in the context of the entire collective agreement in order to cast some light 
on	the	meaning	that	 the	parties	intended	the	clause	to	bear.109 The Court 
considered	the	use	of	 the	word	“all”	 in	clause	10.4(b),	stating	that	“all”	
seems to include any work done on a Saturday or Sunday by an employee at 
 102 Ovation New Zealand Ltd v The New Zealand Meat Workers and Related Trades Union 
Inc [2018]	NZEmpC	92	at	[4].
 103 Ovation	(EC), above	n	101,	at	[268].
 104	 At	[271].
 105 Ovation New Zealand Ltd v New Zealand Meat Workers and Related Trades Union Inc 
[2019]	NZCA	146.
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a	Monday	to	Friday	plant,	incorporating	the	hang-over	period.	In	conclusion,	
the Court considered that the ordinary and natural meaning of the clause was 
clear, all work done on Saturday and/or Sunday which includes the hang-
over	period	from	a	Friday	night	requires	payment	of	T1.5.110
AsureQuality argued that a defence of estoppel applied in this case as it 
did in both Schollum v Corporate Consumables Ltd 111 and Singh v Trustees 
of Wellington Rudolf Steiner Kindergarten Trust.112 In order to establish a 
defence	of	estoppel,	four	key	elements	must	be	satisfied:
(a)	A belief or expectation must have been created or encouraged through 
some action, representation, or omission to act by the party against 
whom	the	estoppel	is	alleged;




(d)	 It must be unconscionable for the party against whom the estoppel is 
alleged	to	depart	from	that	belief	or	expectation.
With	regard	to	the	first	element,	AsureQuality	argued	that	 the	defendant	
accepted on behalf of its members that the hang-over provisions did not 
apply	to	Monday–Friday	shifts.	However,	 the	Court	acknowledged	that	
the company was making payments in accordance with the defendant’s 
interpretation	at	one	of	its	other	plants.	Therefore,	AsureQuality’s	argument	
did	not	have	to	be	determined.113 Although the other elements were not 
required	to	be	established	given	the	failure	of	the	first	element,	the	Court	
considered the second element and found that the issue was one of legal 
contractual interpretation which the company was well placed to satisfy itself 
without	relying	on	the	union	to	raise	it.114 In response to the argument that 
AsureQuality had lost an opportunity to deal with the issue earlier, the Court 
stated that this is not the type of detriment which is required to successfully 
raise	an	estoppel	defence.115 Finally, in relation to the fourth element, the 
Court held that unconscionability relates to the party against whom the 
estoppel is asserted and is not directed at some general assessment of impact 
 110	 At	[23].
 111 Schollum v Corporate Consumables Ltd	[2017]	NZEmpC	115	at	[166].
 112 Singh v Trustees of Wellington Rudolf Steiner Kindergarten Trust [2017] NZEmpC 47 
at	[24]–[25].
 113 AsureQuality, above	n	106,	at	[30].
 114	 At	[31].
 115	 At	[32].
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on	 the	 company.116 It was therefore held that the plaintiff’s arguments 
regarding	estoppel	failed	on	all	four	elements.
X The Penalty Doctrine




that if the second lift were not fully operational by a certain date, Hobson 
would indemnify Honey Bees for their losses arising out of the failure to 
install	 the	lift.	Honey	Bees	invoked	the	indemnity	clause	when	Hobson	
failed	to	install	the	lift	by	the	deadline.
In the High Court, it was found that the indemnity clause protected a 
legitimate interest which Honey Bees had with regard to the second lift 
being	installed.	The	Court	furthermore	said	that	 the	absence	of	a	second	
lift	could	affect	the	preschool	business.118 On appeal, the Court of Appeal 
confirmed	that	the	primary	test	for	a	penalty	clause	is	the	disproportionality	
test.	Therefore,	the	essential	question	is	“whether	the	secondary	obligation	
challenged as a penalty imposes a detriment on a promisor out of all 
proportion to any legitimate interest of the promisee in the enforcement 
of	the	primary	obligation”.119 This test acknowledges that those who are 
commercial	entities	are	likely	to	be	the	best	judges	of	their	own	interests.120 
After applying the test, the Court of Appeal held that the installation of the 
second lift access was of considerable importance to Honey Bees, and the 
business	would	suffer	without	it.121
 116	 At	[33].
 117 127 Hobson St Ltd v Honey Bees Preschool Ltd [2019] NZCA 122, [2019] 2 NZLR 790 
[Honey Bees (CA)].
 118 Honey Bees Preschool Ltd v 127 Hobson Street Ltd [2018]	NZHC	32.
 119 Honey Bees (CA),	above	n	117,	at	[31].
 120	 At	[31].
 121	 At	[57].
